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I examine the diffusion of a major aspect of firm strategy, diversification, among 
a population of Chinese listed firms during the period of 1991 to 2002. I propose that 
information dissemination and institutional isomorphism influence the diversification 
decision.  Using a sample of 2734 observations during a 12 year period, I find that firms 
in the center of the network are more susceptible and infectious in diffusion. Moreover, 
diversification diffuses quickly among structurally equivalent firms in the network. From 
the results, I suggest that diversification is not only a response to economic and agency 
concerns, but also a function of the social context in which a firm is embedded. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Why do firms diversify? Research has approached this question from an 
economic perspective in which resource-related (Afuah, 2001; Peteraf, 1993; Rumelt, 
1974) and agency-related concerns (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1995) 
drive the diversification decision. However, even with the long tradition of diversification 
implementation by managers and diversification research by academics, no conclusive 
results have been obtained in terms of the nature of diversification antecedents and 
motives of diversification. Key questions still remain to be answered. Is it only an 
economic rationale that accounts for a firm’s motivation to seek a diversification strategy? 
If not, what are the other motivations for a firm to adopt a diversification strategy?  
 Aside from facing an economic imperative, a firm is embedded in a social 
context, which might also exert an important influence on its strategy formulation and 
implementation (Burt, 1997). Social network theory, for example, emphasizes how inter-
organizational networks influence firm strategy and performance (Geletanycz & 
Hambrick, 1997; Mizruchi & Galaskiewicz, 1994; Peng & Luo, 2000).  
Researchers on social networks and neo-institutional theories show that two 
important mechanisms in a firm’s network influence the decision of the organization. The 
first is the diffusion of information within a network (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989). 
The other is the mimetic adoption of decisions of other firms or individuals (Greve, 1998; 
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Strang & Tuma, 1993). Diversification, as a major organizational decision in a firm, can 
be influenced by both processes.   
In the diversification strategy literature, research to date has yet to integrate 
concepts derived from work on inter-organizational networks to a firm’s diversification 
strategy, even though such concepts have been applied to other areas of strategy research 
such as in Greve’s (1998) study of adoption of market position among U.S. radio stations 
and Lee and Pennings (2002) study of the diffusion of partner-associate structure among 
Dutch professional services firms. Consequently, I utilize network and neo-institutional 
theory to develop a diffusion approach to explore why firms engage in diversification. As 
I am concerned about both the characteristics of the firms in a network that drive the 
diversification decision, as well as the characteristics of firms that engage in a 
diversification decision, I implement a diffusion model to understand how contact 
between the members of a population influence adopters and non-adopters of an 
organizational strategy (Strang & Tuma, 1993). By utilizing this approach, I try to 
advance work on firm strategy to understand the role of influences, such as a firm’s 
network, as grounded in social network and neo-institutional theories, to its strategic 
decision.  
I test these ideas using a sample of China’s listed firms. I utilize the population of 
China’s listed firms, with data drawn from the inception of China’s stock markets in 
Shenzhen and Shanghai in 1990/91 to the year 2002.  Given the extensive diversification 
that China’s listed firms have undertaken through the 1990s and into the 2000s, and the 
ability to avoid left-censoring because I have data from the inception of the stock market, 
I think that this is an appropriate setting for analysis. 
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1.2 Contributions 
In this thesis, I will contribute to the literature in the following four ways. 
First, the expansion of neo-institutional theory into strategy research reveals the 
importance of institutional pressures for the formation and implementation of firm 
strategy (Ingram & Silverman, 2002). Firms become isomorphic in response to the 
legitimacy pressures they face (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Oliver, 1991). Although neo-institutional theory has been widely accepted by scholars, 
little research has linked it with a firm’s diversification strategy. I argue that a firm can be 
influenced by legitimacy pressures to diversify in ways that are different from those 
advanced by an economic efficiency rationale. By applying these arguments to the 
context of China, this study helps extend our present understanding of diversification 
strategy beyond the efficiency arguments that underlie much of the research in this area, 
and beyond the developed economy context in which much of the empirical research has 
been set. 
Second, this thesis also investigates the role of social networks in the diffusion of 
a diversification strategy. I use social network theory to develop a systematic conceptual 
understanding of how firms located in different positions of the network differ in rates of 
adoptions as a result of cohesive and structural equivalent network relationships. 
Networks can influence actors through both position- and cohesion- based mechanisms. 
Cohesion emphasizes information flows through network ties as the primary basis for 
network diffusion. Position-based mechanisms suggest that a network provides a basis for 
social differentiation of firms into status groups based on their position and that firms are 
more likely to imitate others of similar status (Burt, 1987). 
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Third, I relax the tradition assumption of spatial and temporal homogeneity in the 
study of diffusion. Spatial homogeneity means that all actors in the population are equally 
susceptible to others’ choices and are equally important in influencing others’ choices. 
Temporal homogeneity means all the prior decisions of others have equal impacts on the 
choices of later actors. These assumptions are unrealistic and hinder our understanding of 
the diffusion process. I use a heterogeneity diffusion model which focuses on the 
individual decisions to understand the diffusion process. The use of this model enables 
me to see which actors are more susceptible and infectious in the population to better 
learn the diffusion process.  
Finally, scholars in management have previously concentrated on developed 
countries rather than transitional economies. However, more and more scholars realize 
the importance of transitional economies (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001). A prominent and 
leading transitional economy is China (Peng, 2000). Only a few studies in diversification 
strategy have considered the case of China (Li & Wong, 2003; Li, Li & Tan, 1998), 
which seems inconsistent with the position of China’s economy in the world’s economy. 
This lack of study may result from the unavailability of reliable data. The institutional 
situation is that of a transition from a network-based economy to a market-based 
economy (Peng, 2003). In the institutional environment of China, firm strategy is more 
likely to be influenced by non-economic concerns, such as social network and legitimacy 
pressures (Peng, 2003). Both of these institutional idiosyncrasies transitions serve as a 
good setting for an institution-oriented study.  
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1.3 Organization 
    Chapter 1 serves as the introduction of the thesis, outlining the research 
questions, the research setting and contributions. Chapter 2 summarizes the literature on 
diversification, social network theory, and neo-institutional theory. Chapter 3 presents 
this study’s hypotheses, which are concentrated on the antecedents of firm diversification. 
I distinguish two motives on diversification, in which social network and neo-institutional 
theory play a role in diffusion. In chapter 4, I describe the sample, the variables and the 
statistical models for empirical tests. Chapter 5 presents the results of the empirical tests. 
In chapter 6, I discuss the results in detail before I draw conclusions and identify possible 
directions for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
One of the major contributions of this thesis is to introduce social network theory 
and neo-institutional theory to the diversification literature. Therefore, it is necessary to 
review the literature in these three areas, which is the main objective of this chapter. 
The first set of literature is diversification. There are two streams of research in 
this area: one focusing on the relationship between diversification and firm performance 
while the other investigates the motives for diversification. Since my objective in this 
study is to identify why diversification has diffused so quickly among Chinese listed 
firms, I focus on the latter stream of literature review. 
Social network theory is a well developed theory in sociology. It has been brought 
into the organizations literature to form intra- and inter-organization theory. In fact, social 
networks can be viewed as either an analytic tool or a mechanism of organization 
formation. In this study, my primary concern is the role of network as analytic tool; 
therefore, I will pay more attention on this part. 
Institutionalism, which is also known as neo-institutional theory, was introduced 
by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). It explains why organizations become so similar over 
time. The main concern of institutionalism theorists is the institutional isomorphism 
argument which emphasizes the institution legitimacy faced by organizations. However, I 
will address competitive isomorphism in this section as well since they are equally 
important in my arguments.  
Lastly, since I view the wide spread of diversification as the diffusion of 
innovation, it is necessary to have a brief understanding of the diffusion literature. How 
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the idea of diffusion is adopted in areas other than diversification is also reviewed in this 
section. 
2.1 Review of Diversification Literature 
Diversification has been a major topic in business strategy area even since 
Rumelt’s seminal work in 1974. Most of the researchers in this area try to answer the 
question: what is the relationship between diversification and firm performance? 
However, the answer to this question provided by the empirical tests is ambiguous (Dess, 
Gupta, Hennart & Hill, 1995). The inconsistency may result from a methodology 
problem or lack of control for industry effects (Rumelt, 1982). However, we cannot deny 
that the ambiguity may stem from our lack of knowledge on the motives of firm 
diversification. Different motivations of diversification may result in different 
performances after diversification. Therefore, it is crucial to identify the motives that 
drive firms to implement a diversification strategy.  
There are two kinds of diversification: related diversification and unrelated 
diversification. I will address the reasons for these two different kinds of diversification 
in the next sections respectively. 
2.1.1 Related Diversification 
Related diversification often involves an element of commonality among the 
physical capital and technological skills of businesses or products (Teece 1982) involved 
in the diversification. Two reasons can be used to argue for related diversification. 
2.1.1.1 Industrial Organization Perspective 
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Industrial organization, as a branch of economics, focuses on the economies in 
production and marketing to explain the variation in market structure in different 
industries. There are two kinds of economies: scale economies which derive from the 
reduction of cost in mass production and large scale advertising; and scope economies 
which derive from the synergies in production and advertising in related products (Caves, 
1996). Related diversification can be explained by economies of scope. If two products 
share similar technology in production or marketing, scope economies play an important 
role in deciding to diversify. The spillover effects in related products help firms reduce 
the cost.  
2.1.1.2 Transaction Cost Perspective 
Another perspective regarding diversification is derived from the transaction cost 
perspective. This approach considers the cost of exchange and introduces it into the 
theory of the firm (Coase, 1937). Vertical integration can be explained by transaction cost 
theory. If the number of suppliers is small, it is necessary to reduce the transaction cost 
by producing a hierarchy. This is the rationale behind backward integration. In a similar 
way, forward integration into marketing may prevent the brand name from being 
degraded by opportunistic or incompetent marketing. For certain activities, such as 
research and development, the lowest cost way to conduct it is to internalize it because 
the information asymmetry between entrepreneur and potential supplier can be high 
(Buckley & Casson, 1976). 
2.1.2 Unrelated Diversification 
Unrelated diversification, or conglomerate diversification, involves the use of 
disparate physical capital and technical skills among products or businesses (Teece 1982), 
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and each product or business requires its own core technology, market and management 
skills (Dundas & Richardson, 1982).  
2.1.2.1 Agency Theory Perspective 
Diversification may be a way for top managers to reduce employment risks 
(Amihud & Lev, 1981). Scholars contend that corporate managers may diversify a firm to 
diversify their employment risk, as long as profitability does not suffer too much 
(Hoskisson & Turk, 1990). Managers’ concern about employment risk can motivate 
unrelated diversifications, which provides a benefit to managers that shareholders do not 
enjoy (Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1989). Diversification and firm size are highly correlated, 
as are firm size and executive compensation (Dyl, 1988). Thus, diversification provides 
an avenue for increased compensation. 
As a result, scholars argue that ownership structure can be one of the important 
factors to urge a firm to diversify (Hoskisson & Turk, 1990). Hoskisson and Turk (1990) 
contend that firms with low concentration of ownership are susceptible to excessive 
diversification because diffuse owners may not monitor the management effectively. 
They argue that highly diffuse ownership encourages free riding on the monitoring efforts 
of larger shareholders because small shareholders’ potential losses may be small due to 
poor management so that rationally they would choose not to contribute any effort to 
supervising the management of the firm. Hill and Snell (1988) found that managerial 
ownership concentration is negatively related to the level of diversification. Denis, Denis 
and Sarin (1997) find out that the level of diversification is negatively related to 
managerial equity ownership and to the equity ownership of outside block-holders.  
2.1.2.2 Defend future uncertainty 
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Diversification means a diversion of resource allocation of a firm, especially 
when it comes to unrelated diversification. With the rational to allocate resources more 
efficiently, firms in maturing industries, or structurally unattractive industries that are 
expecting decreasing margins and an increasing uncertainty of future cash flows 
(Leontiades 1986), must find new industries for long term competitive gains. 
Diversification into other businesses is regarded to be a rational reaction (Rumelt 1974) 
in this case. Gort (1962) explains it by comparison of rates of return in different 
industries. If more profitable opportunities exist in other industries, firms may diversify 
in such industries to gain better performance. This explanation, sounds appealing at the 
first glance, but it requires a critical assumption that the capital market is imperfect. If not, 
why should such diversification be implemented by firms instead of by individual owners 
through financial markets? Under perfect capital market, such diversification is more 
efficient if it is done by individuals because the cost is less for individuals to diversify in 
unrelated businesses. 
2.1.2.3 Build internal capital markets.  
The only linkage among the various products or businesses of unrelated 
diversification is the financial consideration (Dundas & Richardson, 1982). Teece (1982) 
contended that firms with industrial experience were better able to assess investment 
opportunities than banks or other investment institutions, because managers had superior 
access to inside information and a high control of investment, as the capital market within 
a firm can be more efficient than external capital markets (Williamsons, 1975). 
2.1.2.4 Government Policy 
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Firms may diversify with the purpose to cater to, or avoid, government policy. 
Anti-trust policy and tax-laws are among the most relevant to the diversification decision 
(Scherer, 1980). Antitrust constraints on horizontal mergers led to conglomerate 
diversification (Ravenscraft & Scherer 1987), while relaxing takeover constraints led to 
focused firms (Lee & Cooperman 1989). For example, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) 
reported that the merger wave of U.S. firms peaked in 1968 as anti-trust constraints on 
horizontal mergers had become much more stringent in the 1960s. High personal income 
tax encourages a shareholder to retain funds within the firm for further diversification 
(Jensen 1986), while high corporate taxation encourages more acquisitions. Both 
shareholder taxation and corporate taxation can exert an effect on a firm’s diversification 
strategy. Auerbach and Reishus (1988) argue that in the 1980s, dividends were taxed 
more heavily than ordinary personal income. As a result, shareholders may prefer that 
companies retain these funds for use in buying and building companies in high 
performance industries.   
2.1.3 Diversification in Emerging Economies 
Emerging economies are characterized by inefficient factors market as well as 
inefficient market exchange mechanisms. Most existing research tries to explain why the 
conglomerate form in emerging economies can perform well. Research does not look at 
the antecedents that are specific to firm diversification behavior in this type of 
institutional environment.  
Khanna and Palepu (1997) linked the performance of conglomerate firms with the 
institutional context of an emerging economy—incomplete information in product 
markets and capital markets, the scarcity of well-trained professionals in the labor market, 
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the extensive involvement of government regulations and inefficient contract 
enforcement mechanisms.  
Lins and Servaes (2002) compared the values of diversified and focused firms 
within seven emerging markets (Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
South Korea and Thailand), contingent on the business group affiliation and ownership 
concentration. Their results showed that diversified firms were less profitable than single-
business firms in an emerging economy, especially when the diversified firms were 
affiliated to business groups. Hence, they did not find support for the argument that 
asymmetrical information and imperfect markets in emerging economies could lead to 
the better performance of diversified firms (Khanna & Ralepu, 1997, 2000). In other 
words, the implication of their findings is that the weak institutional environment may not 
lead firms to diversify, at least from an economic efficiency rationale. 
With the objective of testing whether the institutional environment of a country 
affects the costs and benefits of diversification, Fauer et al. (2003) studied firms in 35 
countries and found that diversification could be beneficial in an emerging economy, 
which they defined as low-income and low-GDP countries. 
Several scholars have conducted studies on Chinese firms’ diversification 
strategy. Tan and Li (1996) argue that ownership structure has an impact on the 
environment-strategy configuration of China’s firms, which has important implications 
for a firm’s diversification strategy. Li and Tse (1997) propose that both market forces 
and the legacy of government planning and intervention are simultaneously influencing 
firms’ strategic decisions of diversification. In addition, Li et al. (1998) suggest that two 
key factors—effective management of external relations and resource and skill building 
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and utilization--may motivate firms to pursue a diversification strategy in a transition 
economy. 
The limited and mixed results from the above research on emerging economies 
leaves us with the need to study diversification strategy further in emerging economies. 
One limitation of the above research is that researchers have not looked into the 
antecedents of diversification strategy explicitly, as related to the institutional 
idiosyncrasy of emerging economies.  
The limitation in literature is that although the above research does notice that 
institutional idiosyncrasies can increase the attractiveness of conglomerate diversification, 
it ignores the fact that not all firms can overcome the weak institutional environment and 
gain value through unrelated diversification. It is also possible that firms possess different 
capabilities to deal with the outside institutional environment, which may lead some 
firms to perform well with a diversification strategy, but others to not perform as well, 
given the implementation of a similar strategy. 
2.2 Review of Social Network Theory 
Social network theory has been a key theory in management research for more 
than a quarter century. A social network can be defined as ‘a specific set of linkages 
among a defined set of persons, with the additional property that the characteristics of 
these linkages as a whole may be used to interpret the social behavior of the person 
involved’ (Mitchell, 1969: 2).  
Social network theory has its origins in three broad streams: sociology, 
anthropology and role theory. Sociologists focus on the pattern of interaction and 
communication to understand the social life (Park, 1924; Simmel, 1950). The emphasis 
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on functionalism leads to the consolidation of the view underlying the determinants of 
recurring social relations (Parsons, 1960; Mitchell, 1969). The exchange theory of 
anthropology (Levi Strauss, 1969; Frazer, 1919) looks into the contents of individual 
relationships, the conditions that foster the existence of such relationships and the 
evolution of such relationship over time (Ekeh, 1974; Homans, 1961). Katz and Kahn 
(1966) view the organizations as the network of interrelated offices. Although role theory 
implies all kinds of network ties, role theory has been limited to first-order roles, which is 
direct tie in a network (Kadushin, 1968; Gross, Mason & McEachern, 1958). 
In organization research, social network theory embraces a unique perspective 
that focuses on the relations among individuals, work units and organizations (Brass, 
Galaskiewicz, Greve & Tsai, 2004). Therefore, there are three levels of social networks: 
interpersonal networks, inter-unit networks and inter-organizational networks. In this 
study, I focus on inter-organizational networks. In the following sections, I will give a 
brief introduction to social network concepts in general first, and then probe into the 
antecedents and consequences of inter-organizational networks in detail.  
2.2.1 Social Network Concepts 
Network analysis is one method to conceptualize organizations.  It captures the 
intersection of both static and dynamic aspects of organizations by focusing the linkages 
between social objects over time (Tichy, Tushman & Fombrun, 1979). I will illustrate 
two properties of the social network concepts: transactional contents and structural 
characteristics. 
2.2.1.1 Transactional Contents 
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This concept explains what is exchanged in the social network. Generally, there 
are four types of contents that can be exchanged in the network: exchange of affect such 
as friendship; exchange of influence or power; exchange of information through 
communication; and exchange of goods or services (Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve & Tsai, 
2004). In this study, one of the concerns that I am interested in is the role of network as 
information conduit (Ahuja, 2000; Davis & Greve, 1997; Westphal & Zajac, 1997). 
2.2.1.2 Structural Characteristics 
There are four levels of structural characteristics, namely external network, total 
internal network, clusters within the network, and individuals as special nodes within the 
network. In this study, I primarily focus on the positions of individuals within the 
network. 
Not every actor in the network is equally important in a social network. 
Individuals as a special node within the network describe the relative importance of 
individuals in the network. Liaison, an individual who is not a member of a clique but 
links to links, is a key node linking a focal unit to other areas within the network. 
Similarly, gatekeeper, an individual who also links the social unit with external domains, 
links the nodes to external environment. The most important measure of the relative 
position within the network is network centrality. It describes the degree to which 
relations are guided by the informal hierarchy. Centrality is often used to describe the 
relative importance of the individual nodes in the network. In this study, I will use this 
concept to reflect the relative position of individuals in the network.  
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2.2.2 Consequences of Inter-organizational Network 
Different from the previous section, in which emphasize is given to the formation 
of inter-organizational networks, this section reviews the consequences of inter-
organization networks on the organizations involved. Generally speaking, there are four 
broad types of impacts that a network has on its constituent organizations, namely 
survival, performance, innovation and imitation. The last two are the primary concerns of 
this study. 
2.2.2.1 Innovation 
Firms that are closely tied to each other gain knowledge spillovers (Jaffe & 
Adams, 1996; Saxenian, 1994), but the direct evidence on this process has been rare. 
However, recently network research has shown that strong and weak ties serve as tools of 
scientists to share knowledge across organizational boundaries, particularly if their 
organizations are not direct competitors (Bouty, 2000), and formal collaborative ties 
between firms increase the innovation output of biotechnology start-up firms (Baum, 
Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000;Powell et al., 1996; Shan, Walker, & Kogut, 1994).  
Networks shape not only innovation output, but also innovation input such as R&D 
investment. In a study of alliance networks in the U.S. computer and telecommunication 
industry, Soh, Mahmood, and Mitchell (2004) showed how network centrality moderates 
the relationship between product awards and change in R&D investments.  
The debate of whether information collection is more efficiently done through 
networks with closure or in networks with structural holes is a hot one and has lasted for 
more than a decade. Closed networks in which direct ties are also tied to each other help 
generate trust (Coleman, 1988), while networks with structural holes, where direct ties 
are not themselves connected and are tied to different portions of the networks, give 
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access to diverse knowledge (Burt, 1992, 2001). Empirical findings support both sides. 
Patent rates of chemical firms increase when firms have many ties to firms that are 
themselves connected; but structural holes reduced innovation rates (Ahuja, 2000). This 
supports the positive effect of information access on innovativeness through closed 
network rather than structural holes. On the other hand, Baum and his coauthors (2000), 
discover that networks giving access to diverse information have a positive effect on 
patent rates of biotechnology firms.  
However, there is no reason that the two mechanisms cannot operate 
complementarily. The tension between the knowledge diversity offered by structural 
holes and the trust offered by cohesion can also be resolved through embedding networks 
in structures that can generate trust. Such structures include spatial proximity, access to a 
common labor market, and central organizations committed to information sharing 
(Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004). 
2.2.2.2 Imitation 
It is widely acknowledged that network ties transmit information and are believed 
to be especially influential information conduits because they provide salient and trusted 
information. Organizations rely on the information to make decisions. The theoretical 
basis for the proposition that information transmission leads to imitation can be found in 
institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) as well as organizational learning theory 
(Levitt & March, 1988). This point of view has guided many empirical investigations of 
the effects of networks on the mimetic adoption of practices (Ahuja, 2000; Chaves, 1996; 
Davis & Greve, 1997; Galaskiewicz & Burt, 1991; Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989; 
Greve, 1996; Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; Hedstro¨m, Sandell, & Stern, 2000; Henisz 
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& Delios, 2001; Palmer, Jennings, & Zhou, 1993; Rao et al., 2000; Westphal & Zajac, 
1997). Most of the empirical research finds evidence for imitation, from a broad range of 
study populations and behaviors: from investigating the diffusion of technologies and 
institutions to examining the diffusion of competitive strategies. 
Networks speed up diffusion, even of practices that are widely known. Thus, 
networks do not cause the adoption of practices solely through awareness (Brass, et al., 
2004). Network ties also provide information on the costs and benefits of adoption in 
greater detail and persuasiveness than other information sources do. Gibbons (2004) 
found that different structures of network ties affect the diffusion of distinct innovation 
practices differently in organizational fields. Networks also affect the diffusion of 
behavioral norms. When behaviors are controversial or of high uncertainty, network 
actors that have experienced a similar decision can provide persuasion (Davis & Greve, 
1997; Westphal & Zajac, 1997). 
The diffusion effect of a network is amplified by proximity in social, 
organizational, and strategic characteristics because the decision makers in adopting 
organizations view similar organizations as more relevant and easier to learn from (Ahuja 
& Katila, 2001; Davis & Greve, 1997; Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; Soule, 1997; 
Westphal, Seidel, & Stewart, 2001). 
Similar to the debate over the effects of a closed network and structural holes in 
innovation, there is also a debate over the role that contact and structural equivalence 
play in diffusion that results from imitation. The proposition that competition among 
actors with similar statuses is a driving force of imitation (Burt, 1987) has led to a 
comparison of contact (the existence of a network tie) with structural equivalence as 
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explanations of imitation. Some scholars empirically find evidence that structural 
equivalence is more influential (Galaskiewicz & Burt, 1991) while a large number of 
others have tested the contact hypotheses and found solid empirical support (Ahuja, 2000; 
Chaves, 1996; Davis & Greve, 1997; Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989). Like similarity 
of characteristics, structural equivalence may amplify diffusion from contacts rather than 
replace it (Brass, et al., 2004). 
2.3 Review of Neo-Institutional Theory 
Neo-institutional theory gives great weight to ‘structured cognition’, indicating 
the interaction of culture and organization as mediated by socially constructed minds. 
Since people in organizations are boundedly rational, they rely on routines, which may 
become rituals, to cope with uncertainty. This perspective helps us look closely at 
organizational processes, identifying the very specific ways of thinking and acting. Thus, 
we gain a better understanding of how minds are formed in organization contexts, with 
significant consequences for interaction and decision making. 
2.3.1 Competitive Isomorphism 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 149) develop a powerful concept called 
isomorphism which is defined as a “. . . constraining process that forces one unit in a 
population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions”. 
Competitive isomorphism, defined by DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 149) as “a systematic 
rationality that emphasize market competition, niche change and fitness measures”, was 
introduced in Hannan and Freeman’s work on population ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 
1977). 
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Isomorphism is the concept used to refer to this process of homogenization of 
organizations in a particular area. Competitive isomorphism assumes a system of 
rationality, which emphasizes market competition, niche change and fitness measures, 
and is most relevant where free and open competition exists. When firms compete with 
each other on the basis of their status, firms of similar status will be in a similar 
competitive environment. Therefore, competitive isomorphism will lead firms of similar 
status to have similar strategic choices. 
Institutional theorists argue that economic explanations rely exclusively on 
competitive isomorphism driven by the rational belief that the new practice will enhance 
economic performance. Competitive isomorphism may explain the behavior of the early 
adopters of a new practice, but it does not provide a good account of how the practice 
spreads over time. Therefore, competitive isomorphism itself cannot give us a complete 
picture of the diffusion process. We need the concept of institutional isomorphism to 
complement competitive isomorphism. In fact, institutional isomorphism has been the 
main focus of institutional theorists. 
2.3.2 Institutional Isomorphism 
While “competitive” isomorphism occurs in a rational system focusing on market 
competition, “institutional isomorphism” occurs when organizations must compete with 
other organizations for social status besides economic fitness, for political power, and for 
institutional legitimacy, aside from resources and customers (Shepard, Betz, O’Connell, 
1997). In such circumstances, the role of government and institutional legitimacy become 
important. Institutional environments, as opposed to technical ones, have an elaboration 
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of requirements and regulations to which organizations must conform in order to receive 
support and appear legitimate (Shanks-Meile & Dobratz, 1995).  
Institutional rules function as myths which organizations incorporate, fostering 
stability, legitimacy, resources, and increasing survival prospects. Conformity to 
institutional rules often conflicts with efficiency criteria (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). There 
are gaps between formal structures of organizations and the prevailing social behaviors in 
organizations within institutional environments. According to Scott (1987), institutional 
theory recognizes the importance of organizations being shaped by their environments 
but emphasizes the impact of social and cultural pressures, rather than rational pressures, 
for effective performance. 
According to institutional theorists, once a number of firms adopt an innovation, 
more future adoption, especially in uncertain environments, is more likely to result from 
“institutional isomorphism”, or firms adopting a new practice because it is perceived as 
being legitimate, even though its performance benefits are unclear (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Fligstein, 1985). Thus, while an organizational innovation may have its origin in 
certain rational principles, it can become institutionalized over time, and continue to be 
used by organizations even though its economic benefits are unclear. 
2.3.3.1 Coercive Isomorphism  
Coercive isomorphism refers to the formal and informal pressures exerted by 
other organizations upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the 
society within which organizations function (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
The coerciveness in this form of isomorphism comes from two sources. First, 
there are formal and informal pressures brought to bear by competing organizations and 
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on organizations which depend upon them. Formal pressures could be government 
mandates for regulation of safety standards or consumer protection. Firms come up with 
similar mechanisms to deal with such state decrees. Second, there are pressures created 
by the cultural expectations in the societal environment within which organizations must 
operate.  
The tendency to homogenization is being forged by the formal and informal 
pressures brought to bear on business organizations via stakeholder activism and by 
emerging cultural expectations pressuring corporations to recognize the social 
embeddedness of the economy. Organizations have become increasingly homogeneous 
within given domains and organized around rituals of conformity to wider institutional 
norms (Mascarenhas & Sambharya, 1996).   
2.3.3.2 Mimetic Isomorphism 
Mimetic isomorphism occurs when an organizational niche is poorly understood 
or goals are ambiguous, or there is symbolic uncertainty in an environment, organizations 
may model themselves on other organizations. Organizations tend to model themselves 
after similar organizations which they perceive to be successful (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983).  
Chandler (1986) states that firms in the early twentieth century grew in a similar 
manner in the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany; i.e., by integrating forwards 
into volume distribution, then integrating backwards, and finally by investing abroad first 
in marketing and then in production. The rise of Japanese firms is a testament to mimetic 
isomorphism as they were able to successfully replicate western technologies at a lower 
cost by perfecting mass manufacturing. In the nineties we find that the circle is complete 
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as western firms are trying to mimic the success of Japanese organizations by imitating 
many of their management techniques such as quality circles, just-in-time inventory, and 
so forth. Haunschild (1993) found empirical support for mimetic isomorphism in 
corporate acquisition activity on a sample of 327 firms. Haveman (1993) related the 
density dependence model of competition and legitimation to diversification into new 
markets. She found that savings and loan associations imitated other large and successful 
organizations.  
2.3.3.3 Normative Isomorphism 
Normative pressures stem primarily from professionalism, two aspects in 
particular: formal education and professional and trade associations (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). The former confers legitimacy to an occupation in a form of organizational norms 
among professional managers. The latter, on the other hand, provides a medium for the 
development and diffusion of professional norms and behavior. Organization fields that 
include a large professionally trained labor force will be driven primarily by status 
competition. According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983) this mechanism creates a pool of 
individuals who occupy similar positions in any given industry and possess a likeness of 
orientations and skills which overrides variation in firm control and behavior.  
2.4 Review of Diffusion Literature 
2.4.1 Medical Innovation 
Diffusion of innovation refers to the spread of abstract ideas and concepts, 
technical information, and actual practices within a social system, where the spread 
denotes flow or movement from a source to an adopter, typically via communication and 
influence (Rogers, 1995). The social phenomenon of the diffusion of a characteristic 
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through a population has been of interest to researchers in many disciplines. A prominent 
example of this kind of phenomena is the Medical Innovation example first presented by 
Coleman et al. (1966). Coleman et al. (1966) analyzed the decision of physicians to 
employ tetracycline as a prescription drug.  
Burt (1987) used diffusion analysis to examine the local network structure of 
adoption and contrasted the effects of cohesion and structural equivalence on diffusion. 
Burt concluded that “there is strong evidence of contagion through structural equivalence 
and virtually no evidence of contagion through cohesion” (Burt, 1987:1927).  Marsden 
and Podolny (1990) examined the medical innovation data by using an event-history 
model. They adopted a multiplicative diffusion model estimated by the partial likelihood 
method. They also focused on the effects of cohesion and structural equivalence. Their 
conclusion was that neither the proportion of structurally equivalent alters nor the 
portions of cohesive alters significantly increased the hazard rate of adoption. Strang and 
Tuma (1993) introduced the concepts of spatial and temporal heterogeneity in diffusion 
models. They considered the characteristics of adopter and spreader, the spreader’s 
adoption event and the social linkages in the model. They also put network centrality into 
consideration and found that network centrality did not affect the propensity of an 
individual’s adoption. Network centrality, however, could affect the contagion via the 
susceptibility to others’ adoptions.  
2.4.2 Diffusion in other areas 
Davis and Greve (1997) studied the diffusion of two innovative governance 
mechanisms: poison pills and golden parachutes. Their conclusions on the diffusion 
processes were that poison pills spread rapidly through a board-to-board (cohesive) 
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diffusion process. Golden parachutes spread slowly and the medium for diffusion was 
geographic proximity. Soule and Zylan (1997) used diffusion models to examine how 
intrastate and interstate processes affected the rate of enactment of state-level reform in 
ADC/AFDC eligibility requirements. They found that work requirements diffused among 
states that were culturally and/or institutionally linked. Greve (1998) used a diffusion 
model to examine the contagion effects of mimetic adoption of market positions. He 
concluded that recently innovated market positions are mimetically adopted by 
organizations that could easily observe it and see them as relevant to their own market 
situations. 
2.4.3 Diffusion Theories 
Theories bearing on innovation diffusion typically specify one of the three types 
of bandwagon processes: increasing return theory, learning theory, and fad theory. 
Increasing return theory assumes that the profitability of innovations is unambiguous and 
potential adopters can decide to adopt based on a simple cost-benefit analysis (Davies, 
1979). Since this is uncommon in the diffusion of diversification strategy in China, I do 
not consider this theory in the thesis. 
Learning theory proposes that information about innovation tends to cause 
potential adopters to learn and revise their assessed profits either upward, causing more 
adoptions, or downward, forestalling adoptions (Valente & Rogers, 1993). This is 
relevant to my argument of information dissemination process in later parts. 
Fad theory assumes not only that profitability is ambiguous, but that updated 
information about innovations’ profitability either does not flow from earlier to later 
adopters or does not influence their adoption decisions. Under these assumptions, it is 
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information about who has adopted rather than about the innovation itself, that generates 
a social bandwagon pressure to conform, causing more potential adopters to adopt, 
thereby reinforcing the bandwagon pressure (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1997). These 
arguments fit in the institutional isomorphism process I discuss in later sections.  
2.5 Summary 
In this chapter, I reviewed four separate streams of literature: diversification, 
inter-organizational network, neo-institutional theory and diffusion. 
Diversification has been studied by scholars in strategy area for a long time. 
Traditionally, scholars adopt an economic perspective to understand the motivations of 
diversification. They try to understand the decision to diversify as a rational choice that 
mainly involves economic concerns. Later, scholars try to understand the process from a 
sociological perspective. This is an important theoretical advancement since 
organizations exist in society. It is unrealistic to not consider the impact of the social 
environment on the decisions of organizations.  
Social network and neo-institutional theory are two important theories in this 
study. I focus on inter-organization network theory because it is the network among 
organizations that can explain the diffusion of innovations. I review the previous work 
done in this area. The discussion mainly consists of the empirical findings of prior work. 
Prior work has shown that the existence of inter-organizational network promotes the 
diffusion of innovation and encourages imitation, which is one of the main arguments of 
this study. Then, I review another important pillar of this study: neo-institutional theory. 
The basis of the discussion in this section is the seminal paper of DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983), in which they define two types of isomorphism: competitive and institutional 
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isomorphism. They pay attention to institutional isomorphism and then divide it into 
three categories: coactive, mimetic and normative isomorphism. Although these three 
kinds of institutional isomorphism derive from different environments, they are 
complementary to each other in explaining institutionalism processes. Mimetic 
isomorphism is the one that process with which I am the most concerned, and I describe 
it more in a subsequent chapter. 
Last, I review the diffusion literature. It originates from the study of the diffusion 
of medical innovation. Scholars in various areas have adopted this concept into various 
contexts.  
 27 
CHAPTER 3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Why do firms diversify, especially to unrelated businesses? Research has 
approached this question from an economic perspective in which resource-related (Afuah, 
2001; Peteraf, 1993; Rumelt, 1974) and agency-related concerns (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1995) drive the diversification decision.  Aside from facing an 
economic imperative, a firm is embedded in a social context, which might also exert an 
important influence on its strategy formulation and implementation (Burt, 1997). Social 
network theory, for example, emphasizes how inter-organizational networks influence 
firm strategy and performance (Geletanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Mizruchi & Galaskiewicz, 
1994; Peng & Luo, 2000).  
Researchers on social networks and neo-institutional theories show that two 
important mechanisms in a firm’s network influence the decision of its managers. The 
first is the dissemination of information within a network (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 
1989). The other is institutional isomorphism, which is the mimetic adoption of decisions 
of other firms or individuals (Greve, 1998; Strang & Tuma, 1993). Diversification, as a 
major organizational decision in a firm, can be influenced by both processes.    
In the diversification strategy literature, research to date has yet to integrate 
concepts derived from work on inter-organizational networks to a firm’s diversification 
strategy, even though such concepts have been applied to other areas of strategy research 
such as in Greve’s (1998) study of adoption of market position among U.S. radio stations 
and Lee and Pennings’ (2002) study of diffusion of partner-associate structure among 
Dutch professional services firms. Consequently, I utilize network and neo-institutional 
theory to develop a diffusion approach to explore why firms engage in diversification. As 
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I am concerned about both the characteristics of the firms in a network that drive the 
diversification decision, as well as the characteristics of firms that engage in a 
diversification decision, I implement a diffusion model to understand how contact 
between the members of a population influence adopters and non-adopters of an 
organizational strategy (Strang & Tuma, 1993). By utilizing this approach, I try to 
advance work on firm strategy to understand the role of influences such as a firm’s 
network, as grounded in social network and institutional theory, to its strategic decision.  
Diversification, as one of the main ways in which organizations change their core 
domain (Haveman, 1993), is one particular good setting to study the role of network in 
the process of institutionalism. Information must be gathered on the nature of the 
potential new markets and on how to implement the strategy. When market does not 
provide adequate information, network plays an important role to help organizations 
make choice (Rangan, 2000). There are three conditions under which markets can be 
considered to be inadequate to reveal information. First, if the practice under 
consideration is new or unprecedented, its effects on firm performance in the short run 
are minimal or non-existent, and the market does not have experience in evaluating it. A 
related second condition could be that firms wish to decide whether to adopt this practice 
in the immediate future, in a period in which the market’s response to adoption by other 
firms is not likely to be available. Finally, market information could be insufficient if the 
specific information that firms seek pertains not to the outcome of the decision, but to the 
way in which it is to be implemented. Diversification, an important corporate strategy 
that may influence the growth and development of the firm, satisfies all of the three 
conditions. First, it is quite new for most of the firms and its effects on performance 
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cannot be observed in a short period. When firms decide to diversity, especially into 
unrelated businesses, they are entering a relatively new area which they are not familiar 
with. Most of the time, it takes years for firms to observe the actual effects of the 
diversification on firms’ performance. Second, as the result of the first point, the market 
responses to the effects of the diversification of other firms are not available in a short 
period. At last, when firms make the decision to diversify, it is crucial for them to know 
how to implement such a complicated strategy. However, it is even harder for firms to 
obtain information on how to implement the diversification strategy from market. 
Therefore, the current context of diversification provides an excellent platform for us to 
observe the role of social network in helping managers make the decision. 
Conventional diffusion models make two assumptions: first, spatial homogeneity, 
each and every member of the population has the same probability of influencing and 
being influenced by other population members; second, temporal homogeneity, the 
influence of the prior adoption on potential adopters does not vary with the length of time 
since the adoption (Strang & Tuma, 1993). These two assumptions are unrealistic but 
since conventional diffusion models are conceptualized at the population level, it is 
difficult to relax the assumption of spatial and temporal homogeneity.  
Strang and Tuma (1993) propose a new diffusion model which shifts the level of 
analysis to the individual actor rather than the population. By looking at the hazard rate of 
each individual, the model translates the population level diffusion equation into an 
analogous equation at the micro level. Therefore, besides the propensity effects, which 
are the direct effects of any number of covariates, the model can capture three other sets 
of vectors. Susceptibility vector incorporates the notion that some actors are more 
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vulnerable to the adoptions of other actors. Infectiousness incorporates the notion that the 
adoption of certain actors has more influence on the adoption of other actors. Proximity 
vector stands for the actual effects of diffusion, which means the adoption of proximate 
actors influences each other’s choices. 
3.1 Information Dissemination 
Some clarifications are needed here to make my following arguments clear. The 
network tie here is ‘indirect’ by nature because it is created through a common third party. 
In other words, two firms are connected when they have at least one common owner 
which serves as disseminator of information. There is no direct tie here because most of 
the time, the owner of a firm is not a listed company (they may be government, individual 
or not-listed firms) and thus may not be involved in diversification. Indirect ties can also 
serve as a channel for information dissemination. Indirect ties may be an effective way 
for actors to enjoy the benefits of network size without paying the costs of network 
maintenance associated with direct ties (Burt, 1992). For example, Ahuja (2000) found 
that indirect ties are better predictor of a firm’s innovation output than direct ties.  
Information is indeed one of the most important resources that an organization 
can gain from its network. Executives often encounter information deficiency related-
problems when making decisions (Greve, 1998). The learning theory of diffusion 
emphasizes on the role of information in the diffusion process. Since an innovation’s 
profitability is ambiguous, potential adopters need the information about the innovation 
to make the decision of whether to adopt (Rogers, 1995). As more potential adopters of 
an innovation adopt it, however, they generate more information bearing on the 
innovation, such as the details on the innovation, how to adopt the innovation efficiently. 
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As potential adopters gain more information and learn more about the innovation, they 
are in a better position of making the decision (Valente & Rogers, 1993).  
A network is one source of such information which is difficult to obtain. For those 
organizations that have ties with each other in a network, they are more likely to receive 
information and to give more weight to such information (Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; 
March, 1994). Moreover, they are more likely to think alike or behave similarly over time 
because of the contact diffusion through networks of ties linking them (Rogers, 1983). 
An inter-firm tie can be the channel of communications between the firm and its many 
indirect contacts (Ahuja, 2000; Davis, 1991; Mizruchi, 1989). Such network ties facilitate 
the match between technology and organization by helping decision makers learn more 
about the innovations which fits the unique needs (Mansfield, 1971; Rogers, 1983).  
The indirect tie provides the focal firm the knowledge and experience of its 
partner as well as the partner’s partners (Gulati & Garguilo, 1999). The indirect tie 
therefore serves as an information conduit, with each firm connected to the network being 
both receipt and transmitter of information (Rogers & Kincaid, 1981).  
This kind of communication is even more important in the diffusion of innovation. 
First, innovation is often an information-intensive activity in terms of both information 
gathering and information processing. Diversification is such a strategy that requires 
large amount of information. It is unlikely that a focal firm is directly connected to a 
variety of firms in different industries. But with indirect ties, it is much easier. Therefore, 
the existence of indirect ties broadens the range of information that the focal firm can get. 
The network ties can increase the focal firm’s catchment area of information (Ahuja, 
2000). In other words, the network ties serve as an information-gathering tool. Second, 
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there is considerable uncertainty involved in the diffusion of innovations. Social network 
theory suggests that in situations of environmental turbulence, decision makers are even 
more likely to rely on interfirm network ties to get access to information which is useful 
for making the decision (Marsden & Friedkin, 1993). Interfirm network ties can likewise 
have a strong influence on decision makers when there is trust between two tied firms. 
Trust and ease of access encourage the transfer of detailed information of high quality 
(Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Therefore, the comments and experience of others who 
have interorganizational ties can be an important source of information when executives 
formulate strategies for their organizations (Galaskiewicz, 1985).  
Additionally, in the context of the indirect tie formed by common ownership, 
there is a greater chance that the firm’s are ultimately governed by similar decision 
makers, and the probability of detailed communication between the organizations is high.  
If communication is detailed and common, it will permit the diffusion of strategic 
decisions (Greve, 1998) and information will diffuse quickly from an owner to the focal 
firm. In the case of the diffusion of a strategic decision in the network defined here, the 
information diffusion can travel in the following way: the owner has an equity stake in 
other firms that undertake a strategic decision. Based on the experiences of these other 
firms, the owner can gain the relevant information about the strategic decision and then 
share it with the focal firm. This kind of effect is what we know as cohesion. Cohesion 
emphasizes on the frequent communication between adopter and potential adopter, 
through which they share a social understanding of the innovation (Burt, 1987). In the 
context of diversification, potential adopters acknowledge the benefit of diversification 
and how to implement it and then make the decision to diversify, these information 
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rewards firms for effective and efficient control of the operation in diversification. 
Therefore, the decision made in the existence of network ties is efficiency driven. The 
increase in efficiency will trigger competitive isomorphism. Firms become isomorphic in 
terms of diversification strategy.  
In the network, an important feature of the firm is its relevant position in the 
network, which we call, network centrality. If networks serve as an information 
disseminator of information, the total number of firms to which a focal firm is linked is 
important to determine the effects of network on a strategic decision (Lee & Pennings, 
2002). Organizations in a central position are more susceptible to external information 
influences because networks ties function as information conduits. Likewise, network 
centrality exerts a great impact on an adoption decision. In short, networks act as a major 
spillover mechanism for strategic decisions.  
The location of a firm in a network determines the importance of the firm in that 
network. If a firm is in a central position, it is more likely that it will be both more 
susceptible to the flow of information and more infectious of other firms in its network. 
The rationales behind the above statements are straightforward. When a firm is in a 
central position in a network, the ties between it and other firms are numerous, which 
means that a central firm will be sensitive to any changes in the strategies of other firms 
in its network, which leads to its heightened susceptibility.  The same consideration arises 
when we consider the case of infectious. A central firm is able to convey information to 
more firms about its strategic decision, based upon its position in the network. Other 
firms will weigh the decision of the central firm accordingly, which leads to the greater 
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infectiousness of a central firm. Both of the two characteristics of the central firm will 
increase the rate of diversification. 
However, it is important to notice that information is heterogeneous and the 
ability of firms to process information is also limited (Wang & Chen, 2004). Too many 
interactions are one source of information overload. One form of information overload is 
the contradictory information which requires an assessment of what must remain 
ambiguous and what can be deducted to be certain (Sparrow, 1999). A firm in central 
position may receive huge amount of information which is conflicting. It is possible that 
the focal firm receive information from one firm that diversifies saying diversification is 
good while from another one that does not diversify saying the opposite. Under such 
situation, the focal firm may be confused by the information and cannot figure out the 
true picture of diversification. How to judge this information depends on the preference 
of managers, which may vary a lot. Thus, centrality of the whole network including both 
adopter and non-adopter will not have significant impact on the susceptibility and 
infectiousness on the focal firm.  
If we restrict the ties between the focal firm and diversified firms, the picture will 
be different. If we consider the case of the strategic decision we are examining, a firm in 
the central position of the restricted network will receive more information from the 
diversified firms. From the information garnered about the experiences of these firms, the 
central firm knows more about diversification: what is the best timing of diversify, how 
to raise money in capital market, which industry to enter, and so forth.  Likewise, when a 
central firm diversifies, it shares its knowledge and information to all the firms with 
which it has linkages. The influence of the diffusion of diversification is great because it 
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affects many firms in the network. Other firms in the network will give considerable 
weight to a central firm’s decision because they have reason to believe the central firm 
has more information than themselves. Therefore, I have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1a: For China’s listed firms, a firm’s susceptibility of 
diversification will be positively associated with its network centrality. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: For China’s listed firms, a firm’s infectiousness of 
diversification will be positively associated with its network centrality.  
3.2 Institutional Isomorphism 
“Institutional isomorphism” occurs when organizations must compete with other 
organizations for social besides economic fitness, for political power and institutional 
legitimacy besides resources and customers (Shepard, Betz, O’Connell, 1997). 
Institutional isomorphism involves organizational competition for institutional legitimacy. 
It can happen through three mechanisms and I will focus on two of them: coercive 
isomorphism and mimetic isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism results from formal or 
informal pressures on organizations exerted by other organizations upon which they are 
dependent (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This tendency towards homogenization is forged 
by the formal and informal pressures being brought to bear on business organizations via 
stakeholder activism and by emerging cultural expectations pressuring corporations to 
recognize the social embeddedness of the economy. Organizations have become 
increasingly homogeneous within given domains and organized around rituals of 
conformity to wider institutional norms (Mascarenhas & Sambharya, 1996). In many 
cases, it refers to homogeneity pressure from political influence. Such influence may be 
felt as force, persuasion or invitations to join in collusion (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Mimetic isomorphism is a response to uncertainty. Imitation may occur when the 
innovation is not well understood (March & Olsen, 1976), the goals are not clear or the 
 36 
environment is turbulent. When the decision to adopt is driven by legitimacy concerns, 
firms mimic the choices of others in the network. Although mimesis might not result in 
the best and the firms may find themselves following choices that have little or nothing to 
do with either efficiency or goal achievement, they at least ensure the organization’s 
legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). When the majority of the network makes a 
certain decision, there is the pressure of conformation. In general, organization decision 
makers will imitate the decisions by organizations that they label as in the same category 
(Haveman, 1993).   
Given that organizations would try to mimic others in the network, the next 
question is to predict whom an organization will imitate. Organizations often hesitate on 
what strategic choice to follow when they face the environmental uncertainty. 
Galaskiewicz and Wasserman (1989:456) claim that ‘organizational decision makers see 
how other organizations cope with environmental conditions similar to their own and thus 
get some idea as to how to behave themselves.’ There are various ways to define. In the 
context of a network, firms that have a similar position in the network are more likely to 
mimic each other even if they do not interact with each other directly. Therefore, network 
serves as the basis for differentiation of firms into groups based on their positions and 
firms will be more likely to imitate others in the same group (Burt, 1987). There are other 
measurements which we may call social proximate (Davis, 1991; Palmer, Jennings & 
Zhou, 1993). Size similarity is an example of social proximity (Haveman, 1993).   
The institutional isomorphism also accords to the fad theory of diffusion. Fad 
theory assume not only that profitability is ambiguous, but that updated information 
about innovations’ profitability either does not flow from earlier to later adopters or does 
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not influence their adoption decisions. Under these assumptions, it is information about 
who has adopted rather than about the innovation itself, that generates a social 
bandwagon pressure to conform, causing more potential adopters to adopt, thereby 
reinforcing the bandwagon pressure (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1997). 
One sociological variant of fad theory specifies the institutional pressures on 
potential adopters, arising from the threat of lost legitimacy. The more potential adopters 
adopt an innovation, the more it becomes taken for granted that it is normal, or even 
legitimate, for potential adopters to use this innovation (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The 
potential adopters will adopt the innovation because of the feat of lost legitimacy and 
stakeholder support (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Wade, 1995). In this thesis, the institutional 
isomorphism argument is consistent with the idea from the fad theory of diffusion. 
3.2.1 Coercive Isomorphism  
Coercive isomorphism is driven by two forces: pressures from other organizations 
on which the focal firm is dependent and an organization’s pressure to conform to culture 
expectations of the society (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In the first instance, coercive 
isomorphism is analogous to resource dependent model: firms are constrained by 
organizations on which they depend for resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Dependent 
organizations are likely to adopt patterns of behavior sanctioned by the organizations that 
control critical resources (Guler, Guillén & Macpherson, 2002). Second, there are 
pressures created by the cultural expectations in the societal environment within which 
organizations must operate (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  
In China, the first source of coercive isomorphism is the legitimacy pressure 
enforced by the government. Government can exert its power through the ownership, 
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which is a common phenomenon in China. The government will enforce the firms they 
own to diversify, especially in unrelated industries. One theme of the economic reform in 
China is to build state owned enterprises (SOE) into large business groups with a large 
scale, which will result in strong competitive advantages and high profit. The Chinese 
government encourages the development of conglomerate because there is government 
belief that China can replicate the successes of Japan and Korea in using industry policy 
to form large conglomerates, and the need for PRC firms to compete effectively with 
huge foreign multinational firms operating in China. The government also regards 
conglomerates as a vehicle to absorb China’s growing numbers of loss-making 
enterprises and unemployed workers (Shieh, 1999). 
Two major policy decisions in 1993 marked the turning point in China’s policies 
toward conglomerates. The first was the Central Committee’s Decision on Certain 
Questions in Establishing a Socialist Market Economy Structure, which made the 
“modern enterprise system” the crux of enterprise reform and called for the formation of 
large groups that would transcend regional and sectoral divisions. The second was the 
Company Law, which enables parent firms to exercise greater control over their 
subsidiaries within the group.  
This policy is also manifested in the report of the Third Plenary Session of the 
16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Oct. 14, 2003). The 
continuous theme has actually motivated many firms to diversify in order to increase 
their scale and scope, and to cater to the preferences of the government. Therefore, 
diversification in China may not necessarily represent a strategic choice of SOEs, but 
rather an outcome of a government power (Li et al. 1998).  
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The second source of coercive isomorphism is due to the response to the social 
expectation. Due to the legacy of the central planning economic system, a large part of 
social responsibility in China is still imposed on firms owned by the government, 
explicitly or implicitly. SOEs are expected to care of their employees, build schools or 
kindergartens for their children, and provide pensions once the employees retire, etc. In 
order to act like a mini-society to guard their employees from cradle to grave, the most 
convenient way to create employment positions is to expand, or to diversify into other 
businesses. As part of the reform plan of China, a firm is allowed to convert its excess 
workforces into ‘ancillary companies’ that engage in business opportunities outside of the 
firm’s core business, such as real-estate management and repair services (Li et al., 1998). 
The ‘ancillary companies’ are mostly in the service industry which has been a rapidly 
growing industry in China and is able to bring profits in the short run (Guthrie, 1997).  
Summarizing the above arguments, I have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: For China’s listed firms, a focal firm’s rate of transition 
from single business to conglomerate will be positively associated with the 
state ownership. 
3.2.2 Mimetic Isomorphism 
Another potential route for diffusion is mimetic isomorphism which is more likely 
to arise under conditions of uncertainty. When the innovation is poorly understood and 
the efficiency benefits of adoption are not clear, it is reasonable to expect norm-based 
institutional pressure to prevail (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). When managers undertake a 
strategic decision, the uncertainties that underlie the decision lead managers to gather 
information on the potential costs and benefits of adopting such a strategy. When such 
information is unavailable or inaccessible, the second best choice is to search for 
information on whether other firms have adopted such a decision (Mansfield, 1961). 
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Although the actual performance of adopting such a strategy cannot be observed, the 
adoption of the strategy by other firms alludes to the allegedly superior performance 
implications of adopting such a decision (Fligstein, 1991).  Mimicking others thus helps 
to mitigate uncertainty and enhance the social legitimacy of an organization. This process 
is what DiMaggio and Powell call mimetic isomorphism in which organizations facing 
uncertainty mimic others to gain legitimacy. 
Mimesis has been observed to be prevalent in many strategic decisions, and the 
diffusion of a strategic decision can be particularly strong when a focal firm observes the 
actions and decisions of peer firms. An important issue in the analysis of mimetic 
isomorphism is to identify whom the focal actor is likely to observe and imitate. Imitative 
behavior can be strengthened by grouping organizations by similarity of important traits 
(Reger & Huff, 1993). This type of imitation can be called trait-based, in which 
organizations base their decision on whom to imitate on selective traits to define peer 
firms (Williamson & Cable, 2003). Such traits can be organization size or age (Haveman, 
1993), membership in the same industry (Fligstein, 1985) or geographic region (Burtns & 
Wholey, 1993).  
Network can provide a basis for social differentiation of firms into status groups 
based on their position. Firms are more likely to mimic others of the similar status (Burt, 
1987). One way to identify such status defined by network is through structural 
equivalence. Structurally equivalent actors are those with identical relations to all other 
actors in the network (Mizruchi, 1993). However, since complete equivalence is rare in 
actual analysis, two firms are structurally equivalent if they share similar relation patterns 
(Galaskiwicz & Burt, 1991). Structural equivalence may highlight competition between 
 41 
actors for the same resources and trigger imitation between actors who could substitute 
for each other in the social system. Thus, it is natural for them to mimic each other 
because of the risk of being replaced in the network (Burt, 1987). Therefore, I have the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3a: For China’s listed firms, the firms that are structurally 
equivalent in the network tend to influence each other in the decision of 
diversification. 
 
Another route by which one can establish peers is by the identity of the owner. 
The mimetic effect can be particularly pronounced among firms that have a similar 
ownership structure. Because of the lack of efficient incentives and reward systems, 
managers are not very concerned about the profitability of firms. They are aware that 
their position and reputation are decided not by the profitability, but by their level of 
acceptance by the government officials. State versus private ownership is one possible 
characterization of ownership that is readily observable. Since state owners tend to have 
multiple objects in which profit-related performance goals are de-emphasized (Aggarwal 
& Agmon, 1990; Newbery, 1992), managers in such firms may readily rely on easily 
observable strategies such as diversification to set the strategic direction of their firms. To 
secure their own position, managers are motivated to enlarge the firms, as a symbol of 
growth and power that government officials prefer and response to the societal 
environment. I expect that there will be a mimetic effect between state-owned firms, in 
which they imitate the strategic decisions of other state-owned firms, which in the context 
of my study is the diversification decision.  
H3b: For China’s listed firms, the firms with a similar proportion of state 




In this chapter, I developed four hypotheses with regard to the diffusion of 
diversification strategy of China’s listed firms, integrating two research streams: social 
network and neo-institutional theory. The literature on social networks and neo-
institutional theory has grown dramatically in the last two decades. Network theorists 
argue that social networks can influence potential adopters through two mechanisms: 
cohesion- and position-based mechanisms (Marsden & Friedkin, 1993). The former 
emphasizes the information flows through networks as the primary basis for network 
diffusion (Westphal, Gulati & Shortell, 1997). The latter focuses on position and suggests 
networks provide a basis for the social differentiation of potential adopters into status 
groups according to their positions (Burt, 1987). Neo-institutional theory concerns the 
influence of institutional isomorphism. Institutional isomorphism emphasizes how the 
pursuit of legitimacy and power can bring about mimetic behavior in a population of 
firms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Using the ideas from these two research streams, I distinguish between two 
different motivations of diversification: efficiency driven and legitimacy driven. In the 
efficiency driven decisions, network serves as the information disseminator which makes 
critical information about diversification available to potential adopters. Firms adopt the 
diversification strategy because they believe the adoption will increase the efficiency of 
the firms and thus make the firms more competitive in the market. This results in the 
competitive isomorphism defined by DiMaggio and Powell. 
On the other hand, legitimacy driven decisions have little to do with the efficiency. 
Coercive isomorphism predicts that firms will adopt the strategy of diversification 
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because of the pressure given by the government. Mimetic isomorphism explains the 
adoption of diversification as a response to uncertainty. Firms will mimic the choices of 
other firms which they believe to be similar to themselves in some sense when they are 
uncertain of whether to adopt a strategy. The adoption will increase the legitimation 
status of the adopters. Together, social network and institutionalism theory can explain a 
diffusion process (Westphal, Gulati & Shortell, 1997; Guler, Guillén & Macpherson, 
2002). When the decision is driven by efficiency concerns, there is information in the 
diffusion process, which results in competitive isomorphism. When the decision is driven 
by legitimacy concerns, network serves as the basis for differentiation of status and firms 
with similar status tend to imitate each other, which results in institutional isomorphism.  
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CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
This chapter describes the research design with which I will conduct the empirical 
tests of the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. The main contents of this chapter are the 
sample description, variable definition and model specification. 
4.1 Data and Sample Description 
The setting for my study is a set of companies comprising China’s listed 
companies. The sample of Chinese listed companies is advantageous in at least five ways. 
First, the information of listed companies is the most consistent, accurate and transparent 
among the information available for all types of Chinese firms. I have data from the 
inception of the stock markets in China, which avoids the left-censoring problem. Second, 
there has been significant rapid diversification among Chinese listed firms, which will be 
illustrated in the a later section in this chapter. Third, the sample of listed companies 
consists of different types of firms including state-owned enterprises and non state-owned 
enterprises, which is a necessary source of variance to be able to construct an empirical 
test of the hypotheses. Fourth, the phenomena of cross-shareholding is common in China, 
almost every listed firm in China has the same shareholder as two or three other listed 
firms. Fifth, China represents a specific institutional context which is making a transition 
from a network-based economy to a market-based economy (Peng, 2003). In the 
institutional environment of China, firm strategy is more likely to be influenced by non-
economic concerns, such as social network and legitimacy pressures (Peng, 2003). Both 
 45 
of these institutional idiosyncrasies transitions serve as a good setting for an institution-
oriented study. 
The dataset I use is an extension of an existing dataset created by students and 
faculty in the Department of Business Policy at NUS.  Various researchers collected data 
from several websites (www.sunsc.com.cn; www.sse.com.cn; www.sse.org.cn; 
www.cnlist.com).  
In creating this data, the codes of China’s listed companies as derived from 
sources on China’s listed companies, such as Tinysoft (www.tinysoft.com), were inserted 
into a search engine of websites to find information of the corresponding companies. 
Although this method makes full advantage of internet sources, it raises the concern 
about the reliability of the data from those websites. To inspect the reliability of the data, 
the data were compared to data compiled from other information sources such as the 
website of CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission) and the websites of the 
listed companies. Data were also collected on the accounting and stock market data of 
China’s listed companies from Bloomberg and DataStream.  
The companies in the sample covered 10 broad industrial categories: Agriculture, 
Mining, Construction, Manufacturing, Transportation, Wholesale and Retailing, Finance 
and Insurance, Real Estate, Social Services, Media and Conglomerates. The 
Manufacturing industry group is further divided into 10 sub-groups, such as food, 
petrochemicals, machinery and pharmaceuticals.  
4.2 Diversification of Chinese Listed Firms 
Since my objective in this study is to investigate the determinants of the 
diversification strategy of China’s listed companies, it is necessary to adopt a proper 
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measure of the level of diversification. In this study, I follow the diversification schema 
developed by Rumelt (1974) to classify China’s listed companies into different groups. 
4.2.1 Diversification Categories 
4.2.1.1 Diversification Measures 
The Specialization Ratio (SR) is defined as the proportion of a firm’s revenues 
that can be attributed to its largest single business in a given year (Rumelt, 1974). For 
example, suppose a firm has the business sectors such as copper, lead and oil and gas, 
with the sales breakdown across these sectors at 59 percent, 20 percent, and 21 percent 
respectively. Then we can obtain the specialization ratio of this company as 0.59 because 
the sales from the sector of copper are the largest of all. Following Wrigley, Rumelt 
defines a specialization ratio of 0.70 as the dividing line between the Dominant, and the 
Related and Unrelated groups (Wrigley, 1970).  
The Related Ratio (RR) is defined as the proportion of a firm’s revenues 
attributable to its largest group of related businesses (Rumelt, 1974). Rumelt set the 
dividing line between Related and Un-related firms to be a related ratio of 0.70. Actually 
the 70 percent cut-off was chosen by Wrigley because “it seemed to match fairly well 
with the judgments expressed by informed observers” (Wrigley, 1970).  
The Vertical Ratio (VR) in any given year is defined as the proportion of the 
firm’s revenues that arise from all by-products, intermediate products, and end products 
of a vertically integrated sequence of processing activities (Rumelt, 1974).  
4.2.1.2 Diversification Categories 
Rumelt has defined four major categories of diversification strategy (Single 
Business, Related Business, Dominant Business and Unrelated Business). All but the 
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Single Business category has been further divided into sub-categories. The heuristic used 
for assigning a firm to a category is indicated in the flow diagram outlined in Figure 4-1.  
Rumelt has described the definition and quantitative standard for the following different 
diversification categories1 (Rumelt, 1974): 
(1) Single Business: firms that are basically committed to a single business. 
Single Business companies are those with specialization ratios of 0.95 or 
more. 
(2) Dominant Business: firms that have diversified to some extent but still 
obtain the preponderance of their revenues from a single business. Among 
non-vertically integrated firms (VR<0.70), those with specialization ratios 
greater than or equal to 0.70 but less than 0.95 are Dominant Business 
firms. Among vertically integrated firms (VR>=0.70), those that do not 
qualify as Single Business companies fall into the Dominant category. 
(a) Dominant-Vertical: vertically integrated firms (VR>=0.7) that produce 
and sell a variety of end products, no one of which contributes more than 
95 percent of total revenues; 
(b) Dominant-Constrained: non-vertical Dominant Business firms that have 
diversified by building on some particular strength, skills, or resource 
associated with the original dominant activity. In such firms the 
preponderance of the diversified activities are all related one to another 
and to the dominant business; 
                                                 
1 Please note that the category description here is quoted from Rumelt (1974): 29-32. 
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(c) Dominant-Linked: non-vertical Dominant Business firms that have 
diversified by building on several different strengths, skills, or resources 
or by building on new strengths, skills, or resources as they are acquired. 
In such firms the preponderance of the diversified activities are not 
directly related to the dominant business but each is somehow related to 
some other of the firm’s activities; 
(d) Dominant-Unrelated: non-vertical Dominant Business firms in which the 
preponderance of the diversified activities are unrelated to the dominant 
businesses. 
(3) Related Business: non-vertically integrated firms that are diversified, 
having specialization ratio less than 0.70, and in which diversification has 
been primarily accomplished by relating new activities to old, so that the 
related ratio is 0.70 or more. 
(a) Related-Constrained: Related Business firms that have diversified chiefly 
by relating new businesses to a specific central skill or resource and in 
which, therefore, each business activity is related to almost all of the other 
business activities; 
(b) Related-Linked: Related Business firms that have diversified by relating 
new businesses to some strength or skill already possessed, but not always 
the same strength or skill. By diversifying in several directions and 
exploiting new skills as they are acquired, such firms have become active 
in widely disparate businesses. 
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(4) Unrelated Business: non-vertical firms that have diversified chiefly 
without regard to relationships between new businesses and current 
activities. Such firms are defined by a related ratio of less than 0.70. 
(a) Unrelated-Passive: Unrelated Business firms that do not qualify as 
Acquisitive Conglomerates; 
(b) Acquisitive Conglomerates: Unrelated Business firms that have aggressive 
programs for the acquisition of new unrelated businesses.  
4.2.2 Diversification of Chinese Listed Firms: Comparison with U.S. Firms 
According to Rumelt’s (1974) method, we are able to classify China’s listed 
companies into six different categories. The data last from the year 1992 to the year 2002. 
The data on revenue breakdowns provides information on revenue by SIC (standard 
industrial classification) code for each company. With the help of the business sectors’ 
SIC codes, we are able to calculate the corresponding SR, RR and VR of each company 
in every year and then make the classification (Table 4-1). Furthermore, if we want to 
have a look at the trend more clearly, we may pick up three different years: 1995, 1998 
and 2002 to have a clearer picture of the transition rate (Table 4-2). 
Rumelt did his classification study on the basis of randomly selected firms out of 
a group of companies, which was taken to be the 500 largest United States industrial 
companies listed annually by Fortune magazine. The 1969 sample was constructed by 
taking the 100 firms that Wrigley had selected randomly from the 1967 Fortune 500, 
deleting those which were no longer among the largest 500 in 1969 and randomly 
selecting firms from the 1969 group to take their places. Rumelt estimated the 
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percentages of 500 largest industrial corporations that fell within the four major and six 
minor categories of diversification strategy, shown in Table 4-3.  
If we compare Rumelt’s results with those for China’s listed companies, several 
trends are obvious. The biggest similarity between China’s companies and U.S. firms is 
that they both show a transition toward diversification. The most striking trend in U.S. 
firms’ strategic category evolution is the decline of Single Business and the increase of 
Unrelated Business. This trend in isolation is similar to that of China’s listed companies.  
The data of China’s listed companies and U.S. firms indicate that decision-makers 
in many firms saw the opportunity or felt the need to diversify. However, when we come 
to the issue of how firms diversify, China’s firms and U.S. firms show two different faces. 
As for the U.S. firms from 1949 to 1969, it is obvious that most of the firms that moved 
from Single Business to Related or Unrelated Business strategies passed through the 
Dominant category at some point (Table 4-3). It is worth noting how these firms behave 
after they move from Single Business into Dominant Business. During the two decades 
(1949-1969), it does appear that firms that went from the Single to the Dominant 
categories in the first decade were no more likely, and perhaps even less likely, to move 
on to the Related category in the next decade than firms that were Dominant in both 1949 
and 1959. As the managers of many Dominant Business companies seem either unwilling 
or unable to undertake further diversification, this category cannot be simply viewed as 
consisting of companies that are on their way to full diversification. In fact, most of the 
Single Business diversifiers during both decades entered only businesses that were 
closely related to ongoing activities.  
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As for China’s listed companies, the analysis shows that they rapidly and directly 
evolve towards full diversification. For those firms who moved away from a Single 
Business, half of the firms went to the category of Dominant Business and the other half 
went directly to the category of Unrelated Business, without a stop at the mid-point of the 
Dominant or Related Business categories (Figure 4-2). Even those who move into the 
Dominant category mostly choose the Dominant Unrelated category.  
It is also worth noting that while many Chinese companies choose to diversify; 
another group of firms choose to remain in a single business. These single business firms 
came to form the biggest group of all the different categories. It is striking when this 
figure is compared with the percentage that U.S. single business firms have occupied: 
28.41 percent in China and 6.2 percent in U.S (Table 4-2 and Table 4-3).  
It seems that Chinese companies either do not diversify or diversify into many un-
related business sectors, while U.S. firms are more inclined to diversify into related 
industries as a first step toward full diversification. The diversification pace of China’s 
listed companies also shows a different pattern. Managers of these companies seem more 
active and prone to diversify into unrelated business activities compared to their U.S. 
peers.  
In this thesis, I look at the event of the firms’ diversification from single business 
to conglomerate for three reasons. First, as described above, one distinctive feature of the 
diversification of Chinese listed firms is the rapid transition from single business to 
conglomerate. This phenomenon deserves investigation. Second, compared with related 
diversification, unrelated diversification needs more information since the firms are 
unfamiliar to the industry that they will enter. Therefore, the role of network as 
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information disseminator is more prevalent. Third, the decision to diversify into unrelated 
industries may involve more non-economic or social concerns. Since unrelated 
diversification is not as profitable as related diversification, social concerns play a more 
important role in the decision. In this case, social network and institutional arguments are 
more convincing in explaining the decision. 
4.3 Measures 
4.3.1 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables in my event history analysis is the hazard rate, which is 
defined as the probability that an event will occur at a particular time to a particular 
individual, given that the individual is at risk at that time (Allison, 1984). In this study, 
the hazard rate is the probability that a firm will adopt the diversification strategy at a 
given time. Theoretically, the hazard rate is calculated by the following function: 
( ) ( )( )
( ) 1 ( )n
P x P xh t
S x D x
= = − , where S(x) is the survival function, D(x) is the 
distribution function, and P(x) is the probability function. 
It is important to realize that the hazard rate is an unobserved variable, yet it 
controls both the occurrence and the timing of events. However, if we assume that the 
hazard rate varies by year but it is the same for all individuals in the same year, we can 
get the estimates of the hazard rate easily: in each year, divide the number of events by 
the number of individuals at risk. For example, if in the second year, 25 firms out of 100 
who are in the risk set diversify from single business to conglomerate, the estimated 
hazard rate is 25/100=0.25.  
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In this study, I use a SAS macro to do the analyses. The program calculates the 
hazard rate which requires I input a group of four variables. They are start time (ST), start 
state (SS), end time (ET) and end state (ES). I use the annual data of China’s listed firms. 
Therefore, I set all the start times to 0, all the end times to 1, which means a one-year 
period.  For the start state and end state, I follow the Rumelt’s classification procedure 
that I mentioned earlier. The start state is single business and the end state is 
conglomerate. 
4.3.2 Independent Variables 
4.3.2.1 Network Centrality 
To test the role of network in the susceptibility and infectiousness (H1), I use 
network centrality. Basically, there are three well recognized ways to define centrality. 
They are degree centrality, betweenness centrality and closeness centrality. 
Degree centrality is the count of number of adjacencies for a point, kp : 
1




C p a p p
=
= ∑ k , where ( , ) 1i ka p p = if and only if ip  and kp  are connected 
by a tie (Freeman, 1979). It is a straightforward index of the extent to which kp  is the 
focus of activity. ( )D kC p  is large id point kp  is adjacent to, or in direct contact with, a 
large number of other points in the network, and small if kp  tends to be cut off from such 
contacts. ( )D kC p  is structural measure of point centrality based on the degree of point 
kp . The degree of a point is viewed as important as an index of its potential 
communication activity. 
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Betweenness centrality assumes that if a point is strategically located on the 
communication paths linking pairs of others, that point is central. A point that falls on the 
communication paths between other points exhibits a potential for control of their 
communication. To determine the overall centrality of a point kp , I sum its partial 
betweenness values for all pairs of points where i j k≠ ≠ : 
( ) ( )
n n
B k ij k
i j
C p b p
<
=∑∑ , where n is the number of points in the network. 
The sum is an index of the overall partial betweenness of point( )B kC p kp . When 
kp  falls on the only geodesic connecting a pair of points,  increases by 1.  
can be determined for any symmetric network whether connected or not. It is a measure 
of point centrality based on the structural attribute of the betweenness of the point 
( )B kC p ( )B kC p
kp . 
Betweenness is useful as an index of the potential of a point for control of 
communication. 
The third centrality, closeness centrality, is based on the degree to which a point is 
close to all other points in the network. This view of point centrality is also related to the 
control of communication but somewhat in a different way. Here, a point is viewed be 
central to the extent that it can avoid the control potential of others. 
If we let the number of edges in the geodesic linking ( , )i kd p p = ip and kp , then, 
the closeness centrality of point kp  is defined by: 
1
1
( ) ( , )
n
C k i k
i
C p d p p−
=
= ∑  
1( )C kC p
−  grows with increasing distance between kp  and other points. It is a 
simple measure and since it is a sum distance, 1( )C kC p
−  has a natural interpretation. 
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1( )C kC p
−  is closeness-based index of point centrality. It can be used when measures 
based on independence is desired.  
In all, the centrality of a point may be determined by reference to any of the three 
different structural attributes of the point: the degree, betweenness, or closeness. The 
choice of a particular measure depends on the context of the substantive application 
intended. Concern with communication activities suggests a degree-based measure. 
Interests in control of communication require a measure of betweenness centrality while 
concern with independence leads to the choice of closeness centrality. In this study, I 
focus on the information dissemination within the network, which is the communication 
activity. Therefore, I use the degree centrality.  
In this context, degree centrality of the whole network is the sum of number of 
firms in which a focal firm’s top ten shareholders invest. Similarly, degree centrality of 
the restricted network of diversified firms is the sum of the number of conglomerates in 
which a focal firm’s top ten largest shareholders had invested. For example, if each of 
firm A’s top ten shareholder invests in five conglomerates, the network centrality of firm 
A is 50. The larger this number, the more central a firm is in its economic network 
because it has more ties with other firms through the shareholders’ ownership. Therefore, 
the expected sign of the coefficient of network centrality in susceptibility and 
infectiousness is positive. 
4.3.2.2 Structural Equivalence 
To test H3a, I use the notion of structural equivalence. Structural analysis is not 
particularly concerned with systems of variables, which are based on descriptions of 
similarity of individual attributes. Instead, structural analysts seek to define categories 
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and variables in terms of similarities of the pattern of relations among actors, rather than 
attributes of actors. 
Two nodes are said to be exactly structurally equivalent if they have the same 
relationships to all other nodes. Because exact structural equivalence is likely to be rare, 
particularly in large networks, analysts often are interested in examining the degree of 
structural equivalence, rather than the simple presence or absence of exact equivalence. 
There are generally two ways to define the degree of structural equivalence: 
Pearson correlation coefficients and Euclidean distance. Both measures are based on the 
adjacent matrix of the network. Adjacent matrix is the matrix representation of the 
network. It is a symmetric matrix with the actors appearing in the row and column. The 
cell in the matrix is the strength of the ties between two actors. Two actors are said to be 
structural equivalent if they have the same pattern of ties as other actors. This means the 
entries in the rows and columns for one actor are identical to those of another. Since 
exact structural equivalence is rare, I look at the degree of similarity.  
The Pearson correlation measure of similarity is particular useful when the data 
on ties are valued, that is, tell us about the strength, rather than simple presence or 
absence. It is simply to calculate the correlation of rows or columns of two actors. It 
ranges from -1 to 1. By the way it is calculated, the Pearson correlation coefficient give 
considerable weight to large differences between particular scores in the profiles of actors 
because it squares the difference in scores between vectors. This can make the coefficient 
sensitive to the extreme values and to data errors. The Pearson coefficient only measures 
the linear relationships, in some cases, this may be too restrictive to a notion. 
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A related but less restrictive measure is the Euclidean distance. This measure is a 
measure of dissimilarity, in the sense that it is the root of the sum of the squared 
differences between the actor’s vectors, that is, the column of adjacencies. Since 
Euclidean distance is less restrictive, in this study, I use it as the measure of structural 
equivalence.  









−∑ , where pi (or qi) is the coordinate of p (or q) in dimension i. 
Therefore, the greater the difference of network position, the larger D  is. Since 
Euclidean difference is the measure of dissimilarity, the expected sign of it is negative. 
4.2.2.3 State Ownership 
To test H2, I use the percentage of state shareholding of the firm. To test H3b, I 
use the differences in state shareholding as the measure. The percentage of state 
shareholding is available in the annual report of the listed firms. The difference in state 
shareholding is conducted through the absolute power matrix. An absolute power metric 
sets up a non-linear combination of K variables Xik, Xjk where i indexes the influencee 
and j the influencer. The elements of the matrix ijZ  is defined as: 
2 1/ 2
1,
( | | )ij ik jkk KZ x x== −∑  
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The dummy variable is one when the element is zero, it is zero otherwise. 
Therefore, the greater the difference of state shareholding, the larger the Pij is. The 
expected sign of these coefficients is positive. 
4.3.3 Control Variables 
4.3.3.1 Firm Size 
Firm size is an important factor which may exert a strong impact on a firm’s 
performance (Fama & French, 1995). Scholars argue that firms with larger size may 
generate more profits and are more capable of handling risks in daily operations. It 
should not be surprising to find larger firms associated with better performance because 
larger firms may take the advantage of economies of scale and formalization of 
manufacturing procedure. Larger firms may also have more talented management 
members and have more access to external capital because banks would regard them as a 
much safer debtor. Thus scholars argue that firms with larger size may generate more 
profit and are more capable while handling risks in daily operations. Thus, larger firms 
might become more readily diversified. I use a firm’s assets as my measure of firm size. 
4.3.3.2 Time to list 
Time to list is another factor we should consider. It is the time length since the 
firm’s inception in Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange. There is a particular kind of 
transaction cost associated with the diversification: the transaction cost of raising money 
to diversify. Diversification, as a big strategic decision for most companies, will often 
require a large amount of capital investment. In China, where firms intend to diversify 
quickly from single business to conglomerates, the capital required for such 
diversification is greater. Therefore, the ability to raise funds for the diversification is 
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crucial. In the process of raising funds, transaction cost is inevitable. In that case, the 
companies that have been traded for longer will be more able to raise capital. Those 
companies will be more likely to adopt the diversification strategies compared with those 
new-comers of the stock market. Therefore, I use the year of a firm from its initial public 
offering (IPO) as a measure for this kind of transaction cost.  
4.3.3.3 Firm Performance 
Firm performance is also an important factor that cannot be omitted in the 
analysis of diversification. There is a substantial body of literature that investigates the 
impact of diversification on the market valuation of firms. Lang and Stulz (1994), and 
Servaes (1996) find that diversified US firms trade at discounts relative to single-product 
firms. Similar studies have been conducted by Berger and Ofek (1995), Khanna and 
Palepu (1996), Lins and Servaes (1998) for diversified firms in both developed and 
developing countries. 
However, the antecedents investigating the relationship between performance and 
diversification only focus on the performance change after diversification as the result of 
the effectiveness of diversification.  Performance can also serve as an impetus to 
diversify. Those firms with better performance will be more willing to diversify because 
they are more capable of going along with diversification. They have sufficient capital 
and managerial skills to succeed in a diversification. 
Many scholars have used ROA as the measure of performance in previous 
research (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Denis & Denis, 1994). However, ROA also has its 
limitations even though it has been widely used by researchers. It is possible that 
management can manipulate the accounting reports of a firm, especially in an emerging 
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economy such as China, because of the weak legal enforcement and low requirement of 
information exposure. Accounting returns include depreciation and inventory costs and 
thus may bias the accuracy of performance measurement.  
One alternative, Tobin’s Q, a market based measure, is widely used in the existing 
literature. Tobin’s Q combines capital market data with accounting data and implicitly 
minimizes distortions due to tax laws, accounting conventions and industry-related biases 
(Prowse, 1992). I use Tobin’s Q in my study as the measure of firm performance. I define 
Tobin’s Q as the ratio of the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of 
liabilities to the replacement value of a firm. As it is very difficult to estimate the 
replacement value of a firm for China’s listed companies, I substitute it with the book 
value of total assets.  
4.4 Model Specification 
When implementing a diffusion model, four formats of independent variables can 
be used to describe the diffusion process: propensity, susceptibility, infectious and social 
proximity (Tuma & Hannan, 1984). Given a set of covariates, the model uses data on the 
timing of adoptions to estimate the instantaneous transition rate of the adoption of a 
strategy, characteristic, or some other observable event that involves a change in state. To 
examine the diffusion of diversification strategy in China’s listed companies, I adopt the 
model that was specified by Strang and Tuma (1993).  They separate the adoption rate 
into four categories: propensity, susceptibility, infectiousness and social proximity. 
Propensity reflects the non-contagious factors that influence diffusion. A diversification 
strategy may spread without contagious influence. Greater susceptibility means that a 
firm will be more likely to adopt a strategic decision when other firms in the network 
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adopt the same decision. By being more infectious means, a firm has a greater influence 
on the adoption of its strategic decisions by other firms in its network. Finally, some pairs 
of firms are more likely to influence each other than other pairs, and they are considered 
social proximate to each other. It is easy to understand that highly relevant firms are 
more likely to influence a focal firm than others. By definition, the increases in these four 
categories increase the adoption rates. 
The multiplicative framework of diffusion model is defined as: 
' ' '
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) exp( )n n n s
s t s t s t
r t X V W Z
ϕ ϕ ϕ
α β γ δ
∈ ∈ ∈
= + + +∑ ∑ ∑ ' ns  
n denotes one observation in the data and s one observation that has previously 
adopted the focal strategy. nX is a vector of variables describing n’s propensity;  as a 
vector of variables describing n’s susceptibility to influence from previous adopters; 
nV
sW  
is a vector of variables describing the infectiousness of s; and nsZ  is a vector of variables 
describing the social proximity of n and s. The first elements of vectors X  and are 
assumed to be one to allow separate intercepts for these effects. Only one intercept is 
identified for the three vectors V  W  and 
V
Z .  
I use a maximum-likelihood method to estimate the heterogeneous diffusion 
model (Strang & Tuma, 1993; Greve, Strang, & Tuma,1995). This procedure consists of 
including all events outside the sample in the analysis with zero weight in the likelihood 
function, thus allowing the estimation program to detect the influence from adoptions 
outside the sample on organizations in the sample (Greve et al., 1993; Greve, 1995). 
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The model is estimated by the SAS macro mhdiff, which is a SAS-IML routine 
that estimates a class of multiplicative heterogeneous diffusion models. This macro was 
developed by Strang (1995).  
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, I discussed the data sources of my study, the variables I will use in 
the empirical tests and the econometric modeling techniques. The data comes from 
various resources. Then, I classify Chinese listed companies into various diversification 
categories according to Rumelt’s categorization. I use the hazard rate as the dependent 
variable. For the independent variables, I conduct network analyses and employ network 
measures such as degree centrality and structural equivalence. The model I use in this 
study is the Heterogeneity Diffusion Model developed by Strang and Tuma (1993). It is 
particularly useful in the study of diffusion processes. The execution of the estimation is 
finished using a SAS macro mhdiff developed by Strang (1995). 
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CHAPTER 5 RESULTS 
In this chapter I describe the empirical results for my hypotheses tests. In the first 
section I describe the results in the sequence of the hypotheses and analyze the 
relationships between empirical results and the hypotheses. I use the multiplicative 
heterogeneous diffusion model to test the hypotheses. 
5.1 Hypotheses Test Results 
Table 5-1 shows the means, standard deviations and correlations for the variables. 
We can see that all the correlations between the variables are less than 0.4. 
Table 5-2 summarizes the results from the diffusion model analysis. The models 
adopt different measurements. Model 1 is the base model which only includes the 
intercept and control variables. Model 2 includes susceptibility and infectiousness. In 
model 3, I add social proximity of state shareholding. Model 4 further includes structural 
equivalence into social proximity. 
The coefficients of network centrality on susceptibility and infectious are positive 
and highly significant, suggesting that firms that are in the central position of the network 
are both more susceptibility and infectious. This supports Hypothesis 1a and 1b, which 
predicts a firm’s susceptibility and infectiousness to diversification will be positively 
associated with network centrality.  
The coefficient of state shareholding in the propensity part is significant but 
negative, which is contrary to my prediction. The result show that the higher the 
percentage of ownership is held by government, the less likely the firm will diversify. 
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Therefore, H2 is not supported in the test. There are mainly two reasons that may drive 
the result. The first is that the measure of state ownership requires refinement. I use the 
official ownership categorization scheme, which divides the ownership identity into state, 
legal and A-share. The state classification scheme does not clearly and unambiguously 
define the ultimate identity of a shareholder. The second reason is that not only SOEs 
participate in diversification, the government also strongly encourage the private firms to 
acquire poorly managed SOEs of medium and small sizes. Therefore, the effects of state 
ownership on diversification may be fixed. 
The coefficient of structural equivalence in the social proximity effects part is 
negative and significant, suggesting that the higher the dissimilarity between two firms in 
the network position, the less likely they will move in the same direction. This is 
consistent with Hypothesis 3a, which predicts that the choice of diversification will be 
positively associated with similarity of network centrality. 
The coefficient of scores on state shareholding in the social proximity effects part 
is positive and significant. This supports Hypothesis 3b, which predicts that the choice of 
diversification will be positively associated with similarity in ownership by state 
shareholders. 
As for the control variables, firm size is negatively related to the propensity to 
diversify. The result is consistent with the arguments of organizational inertia, which 
claims that the bigger the organization, the less likely it will make a change. Tobin’s Q 
has a positive and significant effect on diversification adoption propensity except the case 
when I add the structural equivalence. The result suggests that firms with better 
performance are more likely to diversify. The coefficient of time to list is positive and 
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significant in the first three models. I can claim that the more experienced the firm is in 
the capital market, the more likely it will diversify.    
 
5.2 Discussion of Results 
Diversification is an important strategy of a firm, and it has been a crucial topic in 
the area of strategic management for a considerable time. However, past diversification 
research treated diversification either as an economic concern (Afuah, 2001) or as an 
agency concern (Jensen & Meckling, 1995). On the other hand, strategic management 
researchers have adopted social network theory to explain the diffusion of a certain 
strategy (Greve, 1998). Research has yet to develop a conceptual scheme for considering 
the effect of social networks on diversification behavior.  
The objective of this study is to introduce network and neo-institutional theory as 
conceptual frameworks that allow for the exploration of why firms diversify. To reach 
this goal, I proposed a framework that combines these theories. First, I proposed that a 
network serves as the information disseminator where information diffuses through it. 
My findings generally support these hypotheses. Second, I hypothesize that a network 
also serves as the criterion of mimetic adoption. My findings also support this prediction. 
Moreover, I consider the role of state ownership in diversification. State ownership also 
has dual roles: it can reflect the degree of coercive isomorphism which increases the 
propensity to diversify; it can also serve as the criterion for reference in the diffusion 
process. My results partially support these predictions.  
In general, the results provide supportive evidence for the idea that a social 
network is important to the diversification decision. Consequently, the inclusion of the 
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notion of social networks into diversification theory may extend diversification research 
significantly. This supplemental angle, to consider the role of network in strategy 
formulation, suggests intriguing new research questions and serves as the source of 
another insight into how social network context shapes firms strategy. 
5.3 Summary 
In this chapter I discussed the empirical results of the econometric models devised 
to test the hypotheses that are raised in chapter 3. Overall, I find strong empirical support 
for four of the five hypotheses (H1a, H1b, H3a and H3b). Only one hypothesis is not 
supported (H2). Interestingly, I find results opposite to what was predicted for H2. 
In all, I find that the susceptibility and infectiousness of a firm is positively 
related to the network centrality, which is defined by the number of ties to the firms that 
have adopted the diversification strategy. Moreover, firms tend to mimic each others’ 
choices when making the decision. I specify two routes for such mimicry. One is through 
structural equivalent firms in the network, meaning that firms with similar network 
positions will tend to mimic each other. The other is through similar state ownership. 
Firms are more likely to adopt a diversification strategy if the firms with similar state 
ownership have already adopted the strategy. However, I find opposite finding to 
hypothesis 2. It turns out that the propensity to diversify is negatively related to the state 
shareholding.  
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS 
My thesis has examined the diffusion of a diversification strategy among China’s 
listed companies. To do this, I incorporated research on social networks, neo-institutional 
and diversification in this study which is situated in the environment of a transition 
economy: China.  
 
6.1 Theoretical Implications  
The results of my study are consistent with the idea that a network serves as an 
information disseminator and firms to some extent mimic others with similarity in 
network characteristics. Thus, social networks appear to have an effect on organizational 
diversification decisions. This finding is important because it identifies a path by which 
social network and institutional theories can be adapted to the field of diversification 
research. Moreover, this study provides early empirical evidence on how inter-firm 
networks influence a firm’s diversification decision.  
The first specific finding of note of this research is that an inter-firm network does 
play an important role in the diffusion of diversification decision as an information 
disseminator. I found that organizations were more likely to be influenced by other firm’s 
diversification strategy and had a greater influence on other’s decisions, if they were in 
central positions in their networks. This result suggests that decision makers rely on 
information obtained through inter-firm social networks to evaluate, at least in part, the 
benefits and costs of a diversification decision. As a result, the existence of a network 
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may have decreased uncertainty about the impact of diversification on a firm’s strategic 
position and its performance, thereby increasing a firm’s propensity to diversify. My 
empirical results on China’s listed firms from the year 1991 to 2002 supports the general 
notion that social actors can gain an information advantage through networks and these 
advantages may reduce the evaluative uncertainty of decisions (Galaskiewicz, 1985). 
The second specific finding of this study is that mimetic processes influence 
diversification strategy. As neo-institutional theory suggests, I found that organizations 
were more likely to mimic the decision of other firms with similarities in network or 
ownership characteristics. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) proposed that mimesis is the 
result of decision makers imitating the actions of other organizations to reduce 
uncertainty stemming from environmental turbulence. Decision makers have the 
motivation of satisfying environmental expectations to follow what a firm should do in 
such a situation. Thus, the replication of strategic decisions will make a decision diffuse 
quickly in a network. Given that the actions of other similar organizations have a 
powerful influence on the norms of behavior that develop within an environment, the 
diversification decision of these firms may create the expectation that diversification is 
worth doing. My main focus is that firms base, at least in part, their strategic decision to 
diversify on peer firms’ actions, where peers are defined by the similarity of network 
position, and similarities in levels of state ownership.  
Third, my theoretical arguments are complementary to the diffusion literature. A 
learning theory of diffusion places an emphasis on the information needed for making 
decisions, while the fad theory of diffusion focuses on the institutional pressures. These 
two theories correspond to the information dissemination and institutional isomorphism 
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processes discussed in this thesis. A network serves as information disseminator, which 
provides the information needed for making the decision. The potential adopters learn 
from the information and make their best choices.  A network also serves as the criterion 
for reference, which presses the legitimacy pressures as mentioned by the fad theory. 
Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1997) have tried to incorporate network theory into the 
diffusion literature. However, they use simulation to generate and support their 
propositions. In this study, I am able to integrate network concepts into the diffusion 
framework and test my hypotheses empirically, which is an advance on previous work. 
Fourth, by using the heterogeneity diffusion model, I am able to relax the 
assumption of spatial and temporal homogeneity, which makes the model more consistent 
with the actual situations faced by firms. Not all firms in a population are equally 
susceptible and infectious, the firms in the central positions in the network are more 
susceptible to others’ decisions and are also more influential in the population. This 
finding helps us to better understand the diffusion process at individual level. The 
inclusion of networks in the heterogeneity diffusion model helps to better explain the 
diffusion process.  
6.2 Future Research  
It is important to note that my measure of network centrality can be substantially 
refined to be more consistent with that developed in the field of social network analysis.  
It is important for future work to identify if the findings of this study persist when 
network centrality and other attributes of a network are defined and measured in a 
manner consistent with the social networks literature. 
 70 
Moreover, my measure of state ownership also requires refinement. This 
commonly used ownership categorization scheme, which divides the ownership identity 
into state, legal and A-share, does have its utility, but it also has important limitations. 
Foremost among these limitations is that the state classification scheme does not clearly 
and unambiguously define the ultimate identity of a shareholder. This ambiguity in 
measurement can contribute to a lack of conclusiveness in empirical work. Further, the 
classification scheme does not clearly differentiate which identity ultimately controls a 
firm due to overlaps in identities across legal person shareholders, A-share owners and 
state shareholders. The inconsistency in the sign of state ownership may be related to this 
reason. Given these limitations to the official categorization scheme, I see opportunities 
to improve studies focusing on ownership identity by developing and advocating a 
refined ownership scheme that focuses on establishing substantially higher levels of 
homogeneity in owners among each type of owner categorized in the scheme (Delios, Wu 
& Zhou, 2006).  
A third refinement to measurement is to expand consideration of the kind of 
social network that can influence a firm’s diversification decision.  I can include such 
networks as that defined by a business group, by a geographic area, or by a supplier-
buyer relationship. For example, firms in the same geographic area may form one kind of 
network and firms within this network may share information. The analyses of other 
kinds of network should complement the findings of this thesis. 
Like much network research, I faced a “boundary specification problem” 
(Laumann, Marsden, & Prensky, 1989), because diffusion processes may operate across 
borders. Chinese listed firms may be influenced by foreign firms. I am not able to 
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investigate the diffusion process across nations. Future research can be conducted on a 
higher level of diffusion.   
Finally, the network I defined in this paper is at the inter-firm level. There is an 
inter-personal level of network between the executives of firms (Peng & Luo, 2000). 
Future research may probe deeper into the impact of this type of networks. The analyses 
of this kind of micro network may yield different results to the analyses of the macro 
network as implemented in this study.  
6.3 Conclusions 
Influenced by sociological claims that the social context in which firms are 
embedded influence strategic choices, I extend the previous work in this area by applying 
theories about network context to the diversification literature. I believe this advance is 
important because network factors can enrich our understanding of the preferences that 
organizational decision makers develop during the decision-making process, and how 
these processes shape organizational strategy. In particular, researchers on network and 
institutionalism theories show that two important mechanisms in a network influence the 
decisions of managers. The first is information diffusion, which means that information 
about the actions taken by other firms in a network diffuses within a network to influence 
strategic decisions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989; 
Milliken, 1987).  The second is mimetic adoption, which means that decisions are 
influenced by the actions of others with similar characteristics (Greve, 1998; Strang & 
Tuma, 1993). I observed evidence of both of the effects in my empirical tests among the 
population of Chinese listed firms.   As suggested by the results of my study, a better 
understanding of the influence of networks will help push the theory of diversification in 
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new directions by integrating network and neo-institutional theory, with the standard 




















1991 100 0 0 0 0 0 
1992 77.77 0 11.11 0 0 11.11 
1993 55.12 0 0 0 0 44.87 
1994 57.97 0.72 0.72 0 0 40.57 
1995 82.66 1 2.33 0 0 14 
1996 78.24 1.39 5.78 0 0 14.57 
1997 74.89 1.97 8.03 0 0 15.09 
1998 57.56 1.96 13.6 0 0 26.81 
1999 48.90 1.86 18.16 0 0 31.07 
2000 43.06 2.32 20 0 0 34.60 
2001 29.46 3.27 29.84 0 0 37.41 
2002 28.41 3.11 31.19 0.08 0 37.18 
 
Source: www.sunsc.com.cn; www.cs.com.cn 
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Table 4-2 
 Observed Percentage of Firms in Each Strategic Category 
 
Strategic Category 1995 1998 2002 
Major Classes    
Single Business 82.66 57.56 28.41 
Dominant Business 1.00 1.96 3.11 
Related Business 2.33 0.00 0.00 
Unrelated Business 14 40.41 68.37 
Minor Classes    
Single Business 82.66 57.56 28.41 
Dominant Vertical 1.00 1.96 3.11 
Dominant Unrelated 2.33 13.6 31.19 
Dominant Linked 0.00 0.00 0.08 
Related Linked 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Conglomerate 14 26.81 37.18 
Total number of firms 300 813 1186 
 
Source: www.sunsc.com.cn; www.cs.com.cn 
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Table 4-3 
Rumelt’s Estimated Percentage of Firms in Each Strategic Category 
 
Strategic Category 1949 1959 1969 
Major Classes    
Single Business 34.5 16.2 6.2 
Dominant Business 35.4 37.3 29.2 
Related Business 26.7 40.0 45.2 
Unrelated Business 3.4 6.5 19.4 
Minor Classes    
Single Business 34.5 16.2 6.2 
Dominant Vertical 15.7 14.8 15.6 
Dominant Unrelated 0.9 2.6 0.9 
Dominant Linked 18.9 19.8 12.7 
Related Linked 26.7 10.9 23.6 
Conglomerate 3.4 6.5 19.4 
Total number of firms 189 207 183 
 




Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
 
  Variable Explanation Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 
1 
LGASSET 
Log of firm 
assets 9.01 0.40      
2 T_LIST Time to list 3.29 2.04 0.21***     








Centrality 2.96 4.29 0.15*** 0.11*** -0.06 0.07*** 0.05***





Multiplicative Diffusion Model Results 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Propensity(Control Variable)     
-2.46* -4.71** -5.13** -5.26** 
a_0 (-1.37) (2.21) (2.24) (2.42) 
0.01 -0.41*** -0.35** -0.34** 
a: LGASSET (-0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) 
0.11*** 0.07** 0.06** 0.02 
a: T_LIST (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) -0.03 
0.04 0.06* 0.07** 0.04 
a: Q (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
-0.56** -1.12*** -1.66*** -1.56*** 
a: STATE  (0.22) (0.37) (0.33) (0.33) 
Susceptibility     
b_0 -4.01*** -4.09*** -7.10***  
(0.37) (0.37) (0.64) 
b: Centrality 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Infectiousness     
0.35*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 
c: Centrality 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Social Proximity     
 0.00** 0.00** 
d: STATE 
 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
-0.03*** 
d: Structural Equivalence 
 
  (0.01) 
     
Log likelihood -1039.58 -272.17 -269.84 -245.58 
Chi-square 
(Likelihood ratio vs r(t) = a_0) 
 
1534.82 6.46 48.52 
Model significance 0 0 0.01 0 
 




 Source: Rumelt (1974): 30.
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